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RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  AND  JAPAN 
The  relations  between  the  European  Community  and  Japan 
are  of  ever  increasing  importance  not  only  to  each  partner  but 
also  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  These  relations  have  in  the 
past  been  rudimentary  and  flawed  by  trade  friction.  Today, 
while  trade  problems  remain,  the  relationship  has  become  more 
substantial  and  more  broadly  based~  and  seems  likely  in  future 
to  undergo  f~rther  enlargement  and  intensification.  While  the 
auguries  seem  good,  however,  and  there  is  reason  for  optimism, 
this  is  no  time  for  complacency.  Much  yet  remains  to  be  done 
if  a  closer  and  more  collaborative  future  is  to  be  assured  and 
renewed  friction  and  difficulty  avoided. 
There  is  little question  these  days  that  the  fortunes  of 
the  economies  of  the  Western  world  are  liable  to  be  very  much 
swayed  by  the  interactions  of  its  three  strongest  economic  powers, 
the  United  States,  the  European  Community  and  Japan.  These 
three,  through  their  commitment  to  democratic  principles,  their 
political  stability  and  their  economic  strength  also  exercise 
a  significant  political  influence  in  the  world. 
Both  Japan  and  the  Community  have  devoted  effort  and  invested 
political  capital  into  strengthening  their  side  of  this  triangle. 
But  the  bilateral  relationship  is  also  a  problematical  one. 
Partly  because  it  is  still  very  much  in  evolution  (as  compared 
to  the  now  mature,  well-established  relationship  between  the 
Community  and  the  US).  Partly,  however,  because  it  is  marked 
by  a  number  of  rather  fundamental  snags.  These  show  themselves 
most  visibly  in  the  Community's  considerable  structural  trade 
deficit  with  Japan.  But  this  is  in  reality  onty  the  outward 
and  visible  sign  of  a  deeper  problem,  not  about  biLateral  trade 
deficits  as  such,  but  about  the  pac·e  of  Japan's  integration 
into  the  multilateral  system  as  a  whole,  and  the  extent  to  which 
Japan  is  considered  to  have  assumed  her  fair  share  of  the  burden 
of  responsibility  for  that  system's  maintenance.  Clear  vision 
is  not  easy  here.  The  waters  tend  to  be  somewhat  muddied. 
There  is  a  conflict  of  images,  and  also  of  myths.  A  certain 
amount  of  demythologising  is  thus  called  for. 
/In  a  still In  a  still  evolving  relationship,  much  remains  to  play 
for,  and  one  cannot  always  be  certain  what  the  end  result  will 
be.  Different  commentators,  however  well  informed,  discover 
in  their  crystal  balls  quite  different  pictures  of  the  future. 
At  one  extreme  we  have  the  "nightmare  scenario".  At  the  other 
we  have  the  "happy  ending  l>lypothesis".  As  I  shall  later  declare, 
I  perceive  what  might  be  described  as  a  qualified  "soft  landing". 
Why  is  the  EC/Japan  relationship  so  inherently  important? 
Paradoxically,  we  are  some way  from  being  each  other's  major 
trading  partner.  Japan  accounts  for  less  than  5%  of  the 
Community's  two-way  trade,  and  the  Community  for  less  than  10% 
of  Japan's.  We  are  situated  on  opposite  sides  of  the  world, 
without  cultural  or  linguistic  similitudes  and  only  a  recent 
and  patchy  common  history.  Although  friendly  democracies,  we 
are  not  form a ll  y  partners  in  any  m  i l i tar  y  or  s t rate  g i c  a l l i. an c e. 
What  qualifies  and  indeed  compensates  all  this  has  been 
the  fact  of  Japan's  accession  to  world  economic  rank. 
In  that  capacity  Japan  has  become  important  both  bilaterally 
and  for  her  wider  role  in  the  international  economic  and  financial 
system.  From  being  a  "3%  country"  25  years  ago  in  terms  of 
her  share  of  world  GNP,  with  a  GNP  then  5%  that  of  the  US,  Japan 
has  become  a  "10%  country"  in  global  terms,  with  a  GNP  35%  that 
of  America.  The  US,  the  EC  Ten  and  J~pan  now  account  together 
for  over  50%  of  world  GNP  and  of  world  trade,  and  thus  willy 
nilly  they  jointly  bear  the  lion's  share  of  the  responsibility 
for  the  health  and  welfare  of  the  system. 
It  follows  from  this  that  Japan  now  shares  with  the  Community 
a  wide  range  of  common  interests  and  responsibilities. 
As  part  of  the  "triangle"  with  the  US,  both  are  firmly 
committed  to  the  maintenance  of  the  multi lateral  free  trade 
system.  Both  were  important  actors  in  the  last  round  of  multi-
lateral  trade  negotiations,  and  will  be  even  more  so •. in  the 
next.  Both  are  fully  paid  up  members  of  all  the  relevant  clubs: 
the  GATT,  OECD,  IMF,  World  Bank,  UN,  Western  Economic  Summit. 
Again,  Japan  and  the  Community  have  in  common  their  respective 
economic  vulnerabilities.  Both  are  essentially  "workshops", 
using  their  craftsmanship  and  technology  to  create  sophisticated 
products  from  basic  raw  materials,  for  which  each  is  largely 
dependent  on  overseas  sources  of  supply.  The  vast  majority 
of  their  requirements  of  industrial  minerals,  and  about  half 
their  requirements  of  wood  and  paper,  are  imported.  Japan  imports 
over  80%  of  its  energy  requirements.  The  Community,  despite 
its  rather  more  substantial  indigenous  reserves  of  oil,  coal 
and  gas,  still .has  to  import  over  40%.  Stability  in  other  corners 
of  the  globe  is  of  vital  importance  to  both. 
Pol i t i c a l l y,  both  are  part  of  .what  we  each see  as  "the  West" . 
Japan  and  the  Community  practise  democratic  forms  of  government. 
They  share  a  number  of  interests  and  assumptions  in  foreign 
policy.  Being  located  at  opposite  ends  of  the  USSR,  their  funda-
mental  strategic  preoccupations  are  similar,  and  indeed  inter-
connected. 
/It  follows  that It  follows  that  each  has  - or  should  have  - a  deep  and 
vested  interest  in  the  other's  welfare.  Europeans  want  to  see 
a  strong  and  stable  Japan.  And,  as  the  Japanese  Foreign  Minister 
commented  recently,  "a  strong,  united  and  prosperous  Europe 
is  needed  by  Japan  too".  Or  as  Prime  Minister  Nakasone  has 
observed:  "security .is  indivisible
11
• 
As  indicated  earlier,  the  EC/US  relationship  is  firmly 
established.  So,  for  rather  different  reasons,  is  the  US/Japan 
relationship.  What  we  have  seen  more  recently  is  an  attempt 
to  strengthen  the  third  side  of  the  triangle,  by  working  on 
the 
11 missing  link
11  of  the  EC/Japan  relationship. 
How  have  Japan  and  the  Community  gone. about  this?  What 
is  the  current  state  of  play?  What  are  the  future  prospects? 
At  the  institutional  level,  a  useful  dialogue  has  existed 
for  some  time.  Japan  was  one  of  the  first  countries  to  enter 
into  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Community  through  an  accredited 
Ambassador  in  Brussels.  The  Commission's  own  Delegation  in 
Tokyo,  opened  in  1974,  was  one  of  its  first  bilateral  diplomatic 
missions  overseas.  For  12  years  now,  twice-yearly  talks  have 
been  held  at  top  official  level  - the  so-called 
11 High  Level 
Consultations".  In  1984,  a  ministerial 
11 round  table
11  discussion 
was  inaugurated  in  Brussels  between  a  group  of  key  Japanese 
Ministers  and  their  Commission  counterparts.  Ad  hoc  ministerial 
visits  in  both  directions  take  place  with  increasing  frequency. 
There  are  also  regular  contacts  on  foreign  policy  matters  within 
the  framework  of  what  we  call  European  Political  Cooperation. 
On  substance,  the  Community's  dialogue  with  Japan  has  developed 
Less  satisfactorily.  It  has  tended  to  be  dominated  by  our  trade 
deficit,  which  grew  steadily  from  $0.5  billion  in  1970  to  around 
$12  billion  in  1983.  Japan  has  now  for  some  time  sold  three 
times  as  much  to  the  Community  as  we  sell  back  to  Japan.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  Community  has  found  it  as  difficult  as  any 
of  Japan's  other  industrial  partners  to  expand  sales  on  the 
Japanese  market.  On  the  other,  Japan  has  increasingly  penetrated 
the  Community  market  in  a  limited but  growing  number  of  key 
manufacturing  sectors.  What  began  with  s:eel  and  shipbuilding, 
and  then  passed  on  to  motorcars  and  consumer  electronics, 
has  today  reached  machine  tools  and  office  equipment.  This 
process  could  well  continue.  · 
The  Community's  present  policy  towards  Japan  is  essentially 
threefold: 
First,  we  seek  the  further  openinq  up  of  the  Japanese  market. 
We  press  the  authorities  not  only  to  remove  administrative  barriers 
to  imports,  but  also  actively  to  encourage  imports,  particularly 
of  manufactured  goods.  In  paralle~,  we  are  pursuing  various 
export  promotion  programmes.  These  aim  at  familiarising  European 
business  executives  with  the  Japanese  way  of  life,  and  methods 
of  doing  business.  In  this  way,  we  hope  to  make  it  more  attractive 
for  European industries to commit themselves  more  actively  :o 
this  market,  and  in  some  cases  to  :hrow  aside  an  unwarranted 
11 phobia
11  of  Japan.  Japanese  business  is  not  an  invincible 
economic  machine,  despite  the  myth  around  i:  which  some  people 
find  it  convenient  to  keep.up. 
/Second,  we. Second  we  nave  1nv11:ea  1:ne  jopane:>e  'tem?'VfiH'il'f tG ~¥.~<"c;ise 
;  .  .  ' 
moderation  in  their  exports  to  the  Community  in  certa1n  sens1t1ve 
sectors,  such  as  consumer  electronics,  machine  tools  and  motor 
cars.  The  purpose  of  this  is  not  to  shelter  inefficient  European 
industries  from  the  healthy  rigours  of  normal  competition. 
Since  the  Community,  like  Japan,  has  to  export  to  survive,  we 
have  to  meet  Japanese  competition  in  any  event  on  third  country 
markets.  And  the  Community  has  no  interest  in  encouraging 
protectionism.  What  we  do  want  to  avoid  in  present  circumstances 
is  sudden  disruptive  surges  in  Japanese  exports  to  the  Community, 
aimed  at  narrow  product  sectors. 
Third,  we  seek  to  widen  the  interpenetration  of  the  Japanese 
and  European  economies  by  fostering  cooperation.  This  includes 
industrial  cooperation,  particularly  by  ·substantially  increased 
levels  of  direct  investment  on  both  sides;  collaboration  in 
the  field  of  science  and  technology  and,  finally, cooperation 
through  joint  projects  in  the  area  of  development  aid. 
In  regard  to  market  opening,  there  has  been  an  encouraging, 
if  still  incomplete,  response.  Various  import  barriers  and 
over-complicated  import  procedures  were  reduced  or  simplified 
through  negotiation  in  the  1970s.  Since  July  1981,  when  the 
Japanese  Government  first  announced  a  policy  of  actively  encouraging 
more  imports,  there  has  been  a  series  of  market  opening  "packages", 
the  first  in  January  1982  and  the  fifth  and  most  recent  in  April 
this  year.  A  sixth  package  may  now  be  in  the  offing,  to  meet 
criticism directed  against  Japan  by  her  Asian  neighbours.  The 
Japanese  Prime  Minister,  Mr  Nakasone,  has  put  his  personal  authority 
behind  these  various  recent  moves  which  are  of  considerable 
significance  for  the  future. 
The  practical  impact  so  7ar  has  not  yet  proved  as  great 
as  had  been  hoped,  for  two  reasons.  One  relates  to  certain 
specificities  of  the  Japanese  economy,  to  which  I  shall  turn 
in  a  moment.  A  second  probabLy  resides  ln  the  fact  that  Japan 
has  a  developed  and  efficient  bureaucracy,  accustomed  to  taking 
responsibility  for  large  areas  of  economic  decision-makinn  and 
regulatory  activity,  traditionally  the  fief  of 
the  Administration  rather  than  of  the  Government  itself.  The 
cult  of  "Yes  Minister"  exists  in  Japan  as  in  Europe,  and  major 
changes  of  direction  in  matters  of  this  sort  are  in  any  case 
not  brought  about  overnight. 
But  why  does  the  Community  worry  so  much  over  its  trade 
deficit  with  Japan?  Here  we  find  ourselves  once  again  in  the 
realm  of  paradox.  After  all,  we  Live  in  a  multilateral,  not 
a  bilateral,  trading  system.  We  have  Large  deficits  with  other 
trading  partners  (for  example  we  ran  until  last  year  a  trade 
deficit  of  similar  magnitude  with  the  US  without  getting 
particularly  hot  under  the  collar  about  it).  And  since  we  have 
big  surplusses  with  yet  other  partners,  does  it  not  all  amount 
to  a  question  of  swings  and  roundabouts?  Part  of  the  reason, 
once  again,  with  Japan  is  that  the  deficit  is  a  symptom  of  a 
more  fundamental  issue  concerning  the  role  of  Japan  in  the 
international  system  and  her  degree  of  integr~tion therein. 
T h e r e  i s  t o d a y ,  I  s u s p·e c t ,  a  f  a i r l y  w i d e s p r e a d  f e e l i n g 
among  Japan's  trading  partners  that  she  could  do  more  to  shoulder 
the  obligations  which  are  now  the  inescapable  corollary  of  her 
achievements. 
/An  extreme  version ~~-------~--------~-----~-----~~~------------------
An  extreme  version  of  this  view  was  expressed  in  a  book 
published  last  year  by  an  American  scholar,  in  which  the  chapter 
on"Japan  and  the  world"begins  with  the  proposition  that  Japan 
"has  become  an  economic  superpower  but  has  refused  to  take  an 
active  part  in  running  the  affairs  of  an  increasingly  complex 
and  fragmented  world  •••  Japan  has  been  content  quietly  to  amass 
wealth  and  has  watched  from  the  wings  as  other  powers  jostled 
each  other  tor  center  stage".  It  this  was  true  of  the  past, 
it  is  happily  no  longer  true  today.  Justice  needs  to  be  done 
to  Japan's  present  political  Leadership.  Mr  Gaston  Thorn, 
President  of  the  European  Commission,  for  his  part  said  in  Tokyo 
this  year  during  his  official  visit,  "Greatness  always  brings 
servitude.  Success  carries  with  it  its  own  responsibilities". 
But  Mr  Thorn  expressed  confidence  in  Prim~ Minister  Nakasone 
and  his  Cabinet  colleagues  to  do  what  was  reasonably  within 
their  power  to  assert  the  Leadership  which  the  world  expects 
from  modern  Japan. 
You  may  ask  what  all  this  really  means.  Take  first  the 
multilateral  trading  system.  It  draws  its  strength  essentially 
from  the  tremendous  expansion  of  trade  in  manufactured  goods 
which  has  taken  place  since  the  Second  World  War.  Nations  have 
always  bought  the  raw  materials  and  agricultural  products  they 
needed  to  supply  their  industries  and  feed  their  peoples.  The 
predominant  characteristic  of  the  post-war  multi Lateral  system 
has  been  the  marked  growth  in  intra-industry  trade  between 
nations.  You  buy  my  Fiats  and  I  buy  your  Volkswagens.  The 
Community,  which  is  the  world's  largest  producer  of  passenger 
motor  vehicles,  is  also  the  world's  largest  importer. 
Japan  was  not  a  founder-member  of this system,  and  for  a 
Long  time  after  jcining  it,  she  was  still  protecting  what  she  saw 
as  the  infant  industries  of  her  post-war  reconstruction;  and  was 
developing  (for  what  were  then  perhaps  understandable  reasons) 
an  autarchic,  self-sufficient  structure  wherever  possible. 
Her  participation  in  the system there-fore  tended  from  the  outset 
to  assume  a  one-way  trading  profile,  a~  Least  for  manufactured 
goods.  Only  recently,the  European  Business  Council  in  Tokyo, 
which  represents  the  1.100  European  companies  operating  in  Japan, 
noted  that  manufactured  imports,  as  a  percentage  of  total  imports, 
dropped  f rom  j us t  under  3 0%  i rt  1 9 7 0  to  about  2 3%  i n  1 9 8 2 •  In 
1983  this  figure  rose  to  25%  and  was  nearly  28%  in  the  second 
quarter  of  1984.  But  in  the  Commu~ity  the  corresponding  figure 
has  always  been  in  the  region  of  40%  and  the  same  is  true  of 
the  US.  Put  another  way,  Japan's  manufactures  as  a  percentage 
of  GOP  have  remained  stagnant  at  around  2.5%,  whereas  since 
1960  manufactured  imports  have  risen  from  3.3%  to  5.7%  of  GDP 
for  the  Community,  and  for  further  comparison,  from  2%  to  5% 
for  the  US.  Given  Japan's  particular  factor  endowment,  some 
difference  is  of  course  to  be  expected.  But  the  gap  has  led, 
rightly  or  wrongly,  to  the  accusation  that  Japan  is  simply 
importing  too  Little  for  the  good  df  the  sys:em  from  which  she 
herself  derives  such  advantage.  Big  sellers,  as  my  Vice  President, 
Mr  Haferkamp,  has  said  in  this  context,  ~houLd  be  big  buyers 
too. 
Then,  the  world  monetary  system,  where  it  is  paradoxical 
that  the  Yen  should  play  on-ly  a  minor  roLe,  d~spite  the  importance 
of  Japan  in  world  trade  (4%  of  official  wor~d  currency  reserves, 
as  against  71%  for  the  us$·and  16%  tor  European  currencies, 
led  by  the  Deutsche  Mark). •ha  worLd  economy.  At  present,  economic  recovery  remains 
fairly  patchy,  the  two  bright  spots  being  the  us  \at  \~a~' 
until  now)  and  Japan.  The  US  has  exported  growth  to  its  partners 
by  means  of  its  large  trade  deficit.  The  surge  in  US  imports 
has  helped  to  boost  production  in  countries  where  growth  has 
been  slacker.  Admittedly  the  interest  rate  policy  pursued 
by  the  US  authorities  may  have  had  a  negative  effect  on  growth 
elsewhere,and  criticism  has  been  Levelled  against  them  on  this 
score.  Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  although  enjoying  increased 
substantial  economic  growth,  has  not  always  linked  this  to 
increased  demand  for  manufactured  imports  from  its  trading 
partners.  In  fact,  following  the  oil  shocks  of  1973/74  and 
1978/79,  Japan  relied  on  export-led  growth  policies  to  lead 
her  economy  out  of  consequent  difficulties  and  support  a  subsequently 
self-sustained  economic  expansion.  In  1982  and  1983,  this 
pattern  was  repeated. 
Or  take  development  assistance.  Japan  is  a  member  of 
the  OECD's  Development  Aid  Committee,  the  main  "club"  of  Western 
aid  donors.  A  five-year  plan  has  been  announced,  and  warmly 
welcomed,  to  double  aid  between  1981  and  1985.  At  present, 
however,  for  understandable  reasons  connected  with  government 
budget  deficits,  Japanese  aid  is  running  at  0.33%  of  GNP,  while 
the  figure  for  the  Community  is  0.51%.  Japan  accounts  for 
75  of  World  Bank  subscriptions  and  5.6%  of  IMF  reserves.  The 
Community  figures  are  28.3%  and  24.6%. 
In  1983,Japan  imported  $6  billion-worth  of  manufactured 
goods  from  the  third  world,  while  the  Community  imported  over 
$20  billion.  With  the  six  most  heavily  indebted  NICs,  both 
the  US  and  the  Community  run  substantial  annual  trade  deficits. 
(The  Community's  stands  at  $5.6  billion,  the  US's- mainly 
with  neighbouring  ~exico- is  Larger  still.)  Japan,  by  constrast, 
runs  a  modest  trade  surplus  with  those  countries  as  a  whole. 
Leaving  aside  now  this  question  of  rights  and  obligations 
and  international  burden-sharing,  it  may  prove  helpful  to  Look 
more  closely  at  the  Japanese  economic and social  system. 
There  is  no  question  here  of  Japan's  partners  seeking 
any  fundamental  change  in  that  system.  In  a  sense,  this  is 
a  sovereign  matter  which  is  not  the  direct  concern  even  of 
friendly  outsiders. 
Let  me  also  readily  admit  at  the  outset  ~hat  we  in  Europe 
need  to  Learn  new  Lessons,  and  also  re-Learn  from  modern  Japan 
certain  old  Lessons  which  we  once  knew  but  have  possibly  since 
forgotten.  We  should  salute  her  commercial  and  technological 
success.  We  cannot  always  imitate  Japan,  or  incorporate  her 
methods  and  values  into  our  own  industrial  and  commercial  structure. 
But  we  can  give  credit  where  it  is  due,  and  generally  strive 
to  be  fair  and  open-minded~  Japan's  technology,  her  manufacturing 
and  management  skills  should  serve ·as  an  example  in  certain 
respects,  as  well  as  a  healthy  challenge  to  our  own  people 
and  ideas. 
Let  me  nevertheless  point  to  a  nu~ber  of  specificities 
of  the  Japanese  economic  system  which  tend  to  cause  difficulties. 
These  features  are  of  cour~e  undergoing  change.  But  unless 
convergence  is  further  pursued,  they  are  not  as  t~ey  stand 
always  very  readily  compat1ble  with  the  systems  managed  by 
Japan's  main  trading  partners  in  the  OEC~.  Hinc  illae  Lacrimae. 
/First First,  there  seems  to  exist  in  Japan  some  degree  ot  impervlous-
ness  to  manufactured  imports.  There  is  a  historical  background 
to  this  phenomenon.  Ever  since  the  Meiji  restoration  of  the 
last century, Japan  has  progressively  opened  her  doors  to  the 
world.  But  there  have  been  periods  of  reversal  and  of  retreat 
back  into  the  collective  shell.  Such  a  time  was  the  immediate 
post-war  period.  During  the  reconstruction  phase,  as  noted 
earlier,  Japan  decided  -may  indeed  have  been  compelled  - to 
minimise  her  dependence  on  imported  goods  for  which  domestic 
substitutes  could  be  produs~rl.  Today,  after  20  years  of  a  more 
liberal  trade  policy,  these  old  Mercantilist  reflexes  have  not 
entirely  disappeared,  despite  the  creditable  reduction  or  relaxa-
tion  of  many  of  the  most  visible  barriers,  such  as  tariffs  a~d 
other  formal  measures,  as  a  result  of  successive  rounds ·of 
multilateral  negotiations  in  the  GATT. 
Beyond  the  obvious  barriers,  however,  Lies  a  complex  world 
of  administrative  regulation  and  customs  procedure  •  Until 
recently,  the  Japanese  tendency  had  sometimes  been  to  apply 
vigorously  their  own  very  specific  standards  and  certification 
procedures,  which  were  evolved  in  isolation  from  those  generally 
accepted  elsewhere.  Non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  thereby 
arose  that  hindered  the  normal  expansion  of  foreign  imports 
(ranging  from  cars  to  cosmetics)  by  adding  marketing  delays 
and  extra  costs.  To  be  fair,  the  Japanese  authorities  have 
recognised  the  difficulties  such  procedures  caused,  and  have 
recently  taken  steps  to  make  their  certification  system  simpler 
and  more  transparent. 
Second,  the  Japanese  distribution  system  seems  ill-adapted 
to  the  handling  of  foreign  manufactures  in  any  large  volume. 
The  system  has  troublesome  characteristics.  There  is  a  high 
degree  of  Linkage  between  production,  distribution  and  financing, 
in  "families
11  or  groups  of  companies,  v;hic:h  tend  to  create 
privileged  chains  of  distribution  from  manufacturer  to  retailer. 
In  certain  sectors,  a  large  percentage  of  the  r~tail outlets 
are  actually  controlled  by  Japanese  oroducers~to  the  exclusion  of 
new-comers.  In  the  field  of  domestic  electrical  appliances, 
mare  or  less  tied  outlets  are  as  high  as  55%.  In  the  field 
of  consumer  electronics,  the  position  is  little different. 
According  to  "Fortune"  m.:~gazine,  Matsushita  alone  controls  55.000 
retail  outlets,  of  which  27.000  sell  their  products  only. 
Finally,  the  distribution  system  is  highly  fragmented  and 
characterised  by  an  astonishingly  Large  number  ot  small  firms, 
both  at  the  wholesale  and  the  retail  Level.  Most  foreign  manu-
facturers  are  consequently  obliged  either  to  go  into  the  hassle 
of  setting  up  their  own  distribution  chains,  or  to  place  theMselves 
in  the  hands  of  a  sole  importer,  who  may  well  prefer  high  margins, 
lo~  turn-over,  and  the  minimum  effort  necessary  to  assure  sales. 
Some  exporters  to  Japan  have  sought  to  circumvent  this  problem 
by  selling  direct  to  the  independent  sector  of  supermarkets 
and  department  stores,  which  are  usually  more  willing  to  handle 
foreign  merchandise.  But  the  further  expansion  of  this  category 
of  outlet  is  limited  by  the  perceived  public  necessity  to  preserve 
the  livelihood  of  small  distributors. 
The  Japanese  financial  system  shows  simil~r  inward-looking 
characteristics.  The  Yen  has  not  yet  taken  off  as  an  international 
investment  currency.  It  fends  to  be  insulated  from  the  main 
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stream  of  the  world  financial  system.  As  we  hGve  noted,  ~t 
has  only  a  small  reserve  currency  role.  It  is  Little  used  as 
a  denominating  currency  for  trade.  Only  35%  of  Japan's  exports 
and  3%  of  its  imports  are  denominated  in  its  own  currency,  compared 
with  an  average  of  from  60%  to  80%  -for  export  sales  and  from 
30%  to  50%  for  imports  which  is  the  more  common  proportion 
for  other  advanced  currencies. 
Japanese  interest  rates  are  Low,  both  nominally  and  in 
real  terms,  compared  with  those  of  her  major  trading  partners. 
This  reflects  partly  the  existence  o1  direct  controls  and  partly 
a  lower  rate  of  growth  in  domestic  demand  which,  in  combination 
with  the  high  rate  of  savings,  leads  to  a  surplus  of  loanable 
funds.  Low  real  interest  rates  have  a  beneficial  effect  on 
manufacturing  costs.  Moreover,  in  recent -years  some  of  the 
surplus  of  Japanese  savings  has  been  invested  overseas,  which 
has  tended  to  have  a  downward  impact  on  the  Yen  rate.  This 
in  turn  helps  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  Japanese  exports. 
Some  degree  of  imperviousness  appears  also  to  prevail  as 
regards  overseas  investment  in  Japanese  manufacturing. 
By  any  normal  criteria  of  commercial  risk,  Japan  must  be 
one  of  the  most  attractive  investment  sites  in  the  world,  given 
its  huge  and  growing  economy,  political  and  social 
stability  ana  established  infrastructure.  Yet  -and  her~ 
we  come  upon  yet  another  paradox  -Japan  remains  virtually  unexplored 
territory  for  the  foreign  investor.  Foreign-owned  companies 
account  for  only  3%  of  sales  in  Japan,  compared  with  20%  in 
Western  Europe.  Total  Community  inves:ment  in  manufacturing 
commerce  and  services  in  Japan  is  only  around  $0.6  billion,  less  than 
one-tenth  of  the  Level  of  Japanese  investment  in  the  Community. 
Until  recently  tne  explanation  for  this  has  been  the  existence 
of  various  forms  of  official  restriction  which  have  put  the 
potential  investor  at  a  disadvantage.  But  many  of  these  restrictions 
have  now  been  removed.  What  remains  are  essentially  the  cultural 
and  psychological  barriers.  It  is,  for  example,  in  practice 
difficult  for  foreigners  to  take  over  a  Japanese  concern,and 
to  exercise  independent  control  over  its  policy  and  operations 
thereafter. 
Clear  vision  in  this  area  - and  here  I  digress  for  a  moment 
from  my  main  thread- is  not  facilitated  by  the  mythology  which 
has  grown  up  over  the  years  concerning  Japan's  rise  to  economic 
stardom.  A  certain  amount  of  demythologising  may  be  necessary. 
Let  us  address  two  myths  which  have  achieved  wide  currency  in 
recent  times. 
First,  the  notion  that  the  Japanese  have  the  most  open 
market  in  the  ~orld,  and  that  protectionism  is  something  that 
only  Europeans  (and  Americans)  engage  in.  The  figures  show 
a  different  picture.  True,  Japan  is  a  ma~or  imoorter.  But 
the  Community  is  an  even  Larger  one.  Most  of  Japan's  imports 
consist  of  raw  materials  and  food  oroducts  whic~  Japan  itself 
cannot  supply  from  within  its  otherwise  h~g~Ly  autarchic  economic 
base.  Japan  imports  less  than  half  as  many  manufactured  goods 
as  a  percentage  of  GDP  than  does  Europe. I  think  we  also  have  to ask ourselves  t~hether  protectionisr~ 
can  really  be  defined  in  the  simple  terms  of  tariff  rates  and 
quantitative  restrictions?  Would  not  a  more  complete  appreciation 
of  a  country's  attitude  towards  free  trade  have  to  take  into 
account  the  degree  to  which  the  importing  country  is  willing 
to  allow  the  competing  products  of  its  trading  partners  to  penetrate 
and  ~tay  in  its  own  market  and  as  a  result  allow  the  exporter 
to  share  in  the  importer's  prosperity~  for  the  betterment  of 
the  trading  system  as  a  whole? 
Let  us  take  the  case  of  textiles  and  clothing,  a  sector 
where  the  Community  is  frequently  accused  of  protectionism  because 
i t  m  a k e s  u s e  o f  t h e  s a f e g u a r d s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  t h e  t~ u l t i f i b r e 
Arrangement  under  the  GATT.  In  1983  the  Community  was  importing 
about  $14  billion  of  textiles  and  clothing.  Japan  with  nearly 
half  the  population  imported  $2.4  billion.  When  it  comes  to 
imports  from  the  most  competitive  exporters,  we  see  that  from 
Hong  Kong,  South  Korea  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China,  Japan 
in  1983  imported  textiles  and  clothing  to  the  tune  of 
$1.17  billion,  whereas  the  Community  took  from  these  distant 
suppliers  nearly  $3  billion's  worth.  In  1983  the  Communities' 
textiles and clothing  imports  from  the  ASEAN  members  amounted 
to  $570  million  whereas  Japan  imported  only  $71  miLLion.  Japan 
has  a  surplus  with  developing  countries  as  a  whole  for  all  textile 
products  of  about  $2  billion,  whereas  the  Community  has  a 
$4  billion deficit.  It  is  obviously  not  only  Lack  of 
c o  01 p e t i t i v e n e s s  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e s e  s u p p l i e r s  t h a t  e x p l a i n s  t h e 
phenomenon.  They  are  somehow  being  kept  at  arms  Length. 
Let  us  take  a  second  myth.  Glimpsed  from  afar  the  Japanese 
economy  Looks  like  a  smooth-running  engine  that  never  misfires. 
There  is  a  widespread  belief  that  Japan  is  a  highly  competitive 
economy,  at  the  forefront  of  technological  progress~that  has 
overtaken,  or  is  about  to  overtake,the  decadent  European  and 
American  economies  across  the  board. 
It  is  certainly  true  that  Japan  is  highly  competitive  in 
a  number  of  important  sectors.  The  staggering  success  story 
of  the  past  decade  has  been  Japan's  rapid  pre-eminence  in 
electronics,  whether  in  consumer  products  such  as  video  recorders 
or  in  electronic  components  such  as  semi-conductors.  These 
new  industrial  pathways  have  to  be  added  to  the  more  familiar 
Japanese  motorcars,  watches,  cameras,  oil  tankers  a~d  heavy 
industrial  equipment  that  have  found  a  ready  place  in  the  market 
places  of  the  industrial  world.  Competition  and  quality  and 
plain  good  value  have  got  Japan  there,and  good  L~ck  to  her. 
But  Japan  is  not  only  a  producer  and  exporter  of  electronic 
wizardry.  Like  other  industrial  nations,  Japan  has  her  problem 
areas  too. 
Foremost  among  these  are  the  special  category  of  so-called 
dep~essed  industries,  now  covering  24  sectors  and  includi~g 
petroleum  and  petro-chemicals,  sugar  refining,  cotton  and  wool 
spinning,  fertilizers.  None  of  these  industries  has  at  present 
much  hope  of  standing  up  to  international  concetition,  and  all 
are  effectively  protected  by  one  means  or  ~not~er.  fo  take 
another  example,  Leather  goods  and  footwear  arc  i'lefficient 
and  costly.  Imports  are  regulated  by  quotas.  In  ~ne  case  of 
Leather,  the  imposition  of  invisible  quotas  w~~  c0nd~mned  by 
a  GATT  enquiry  panel  earlier  t~is  year,  which  calied  for  their 
abolition. ~~~--~---~-------~ 
The  financial  services  sector  in  Japan  is  subject  to  heavy 
governmental  regimentation  and  control  and  is  not  notably  open 
to  much  healthy  outside  competition.  Direct  insurance  is 
protected,  and  dominated  by  a  comfortable  oligopoly  of  domestic 
insurers.  Japanese  bankers  are  currently  busy  expanding  their 
operations  in  Europe  and  the  US;  in  the  UK,  for  example,  they 
now  account  for  over  20%  of  both  total  Lending  and  total  deposits. 
In  Japan,  however,  foreign  bankers  still  account  for  only  3% 
of  total  Lending  and  Less  than  1%  of  total  deposits.  Europe 
obviously  has  an  edge  here,  if  it  can  be  brought  to  bear  in 
a  balanced  overall  economic  relationship  of  give  and  take. 
Europe  also  remains  far  and  away  the  world's  Leading  exporter 
of  capital  equipment,  such  as  machine  tools,  and  is  also  pre-
eminent  in  export  markets  in  chemicals,  pharmaceuticals,  bio-
technologies  and  telecommunications  equipment.  In  space  research 
and  aircraft  technologies,  Europe  has  developed  satellite  hardware 
and  a  new  generation  of  medium-range  commercial  aircraft,  both 
successfully  Launched  on  world  markets.  The  image  of  Europe 
as  an  "industrial  museum",so  often  projected,simply  does  not 
fit.  The  era  of  high  technology  could  indeed  bring 
with  it  new  competitive  tensions  between  Japan  and  its  industrial 
partners.  Some  disquieting  _  signs  have  already  developed. 
Towards  the  end  of  Last  year,  MIT!  introduced  proposals  for 
a  new  Law  that  would  in  effect  remove  copyright  protection  from 
computer  software,  including  foreign  software,  in  a  manner  that 
contravened  international  conventions  in  this  field.  The  storm 
of  protest  that  resulted  happily  Led  to  a  re-think.  More  recently, 
at  a  time when both  the  US  and  Europe  <European  Space  Agency) 
were  actively  competing  in  Japan  to  sell  satellite  and  launching 
systems,  and  when  the Japanese Meteorological  Agency  had  expressed 
interest  in  acqu; ring a  weather  satellite from Europe,  the  Japanese 
Science  and  Technology  Agency  announced  its  intention  to  develop 
a  totally  indigenous  space  technology,  with  arguments  which 
included  the  allegation  that  all  foreign  systems  were  unreliable 
and  could  not  be  repaired  because  components  were  sealed  in 
to  protect  company  secrets. 
The  old  go-it-alone  instinct  dies  hard.  The  implication 
that  where  Japan  makes  something  she  doesn't  import  it,  and  that 
where  she  cannot  at  present  make  something  she  will  endeavour 
to  do  so,  simply  does  not  sit  with  the  system.  I  sincerely  hope 
that  wiser  counsels  will  prevail  to  ensure  that  Japan  does  not 
yet  again  return  to  the  autarchic  reflexes  of  the  past. 
Let  us  now  leave  the  present  and  its  historic  roots  and 
turn  to  the  future  prospects for the  relations  between  Jaoan 
and  the  European  Community. 
Given  the  complexities  and  uncertainties,  this  could  at 
best  be  no  more  than  intelligent  guess  work.  At  worst  it  would 
be  no  more  than  crystal-ball  gazing.  What  I  propose  to  do  therefore 
is  to  look  at  two  hypotheses  at  opposite  ends  of  the  spectrum. 
At  the  pessimistic  end  is  the  "nightmare  scenario".  At  the 
optimistic  end,  the  "happy  ending".  Although  they  will  serve 
to  illustrate the parameters  of  the  problem,  I  do  not  myself 
believe  in  either  of  these  hypotheses.  But  my  own  personal 
crystal  ball  reveals  a  caut~ously optimistic  scenario  - what 
I  would  call  the  "qualified  soft  Landing
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reality.  Most  observers  agree  that  Japan  remains,  relatively 
speaking,  well  placed  to  support  continued  world  recovery.  . 
Its  public  sector  is  small  and  its  borrowing  requirements  st1ll 
supportable  at  around  4%  of  GNP,  particularly  since  there  is 
no  question  of  private  investment  being  "crowded  out"  to  feed 
the  public  purse.  Inflation  is  moderate  (Less  than  2%)  and 
the  balance  of  payments  surplus  on  current  account  (over 
$30  billion  or  nearly  3%  of  GNP)  allows  plenty  of  freedom  of 
manoeuvre  for  stimulating  domestic  demand  and  using  monetary 
tools  to  push  up  the  value  of  the  Yen. 
In  the  hypothetical  "nightmare  scenario",  Japanese  macro-
economic  policy  retreats  into  an  obsession-about  the  Level  of 
public  debt,  and  formulates  the  resolve  to  insulate  Japan  to 
some  extent  from  the  international  economic  adjustment  process 
which  other  countries  are  having  to  go  through.  Domestic  demand 
is  held  back  (directly  in  the  public  sector  and  indirectly  by 
constraining  household  disposable  income);  interest  rates  are 
kept  Low  by  direct  controls;  this  in  turn  both  depresses  the 
Yen  and  facilitates  domestic  industrial  investment.  At  the 
same  time,  Japan  takes  full  advantage  of  its  membership  of 
the  liberal  trading  system  to  boost  its  already relatively strong 
growth  rate  by  aggressively  expanding  its  exports  in  those 
relatively  narrow  sectors  where  its  economy  is  extremely  productive. 
These  policies  predictably  lead  to  increased  friction 
between  Japan  and  its  major  trading  partners.  The  Community's 
own  trade  deficit  with  Japan  grows  remorselessLy.  European 
exporters  continue  to  be  frustrated  in  their  efforts  to  penetrate 
the  Japanese  market.  Key  sectors  of  European  industry  find 
themselves  under  nuw  intolerable  pressure  from  Japanese  exports. 
European  firms  attempting  to  market  new  high  technology  products 
find  the  rug  pulled  out  from  under  their  feet  by  pre-emptive 
strikes  on  the  part  of  Japanese  exporters.  Major  sectors  of 
the  Community's  population  come  to  see  their  economic  and 
professional  existence  as  being  threatened,  especially  as  Japan's 
success  often  appears  to  occur  precisely  in  those  parts  of 
our  economy  which  are  already  most  vulnerable.  Against  the 
background  of  consistently  rising  unemployment  (already  projected 
to  reach  11.5%  next  year)  and  of  marked  disparities  of  econom;c 
performance  in  different  regions  of  the  Community,  this  build-
up  of  social  and  economic  resentment  fuels  a  political  backlash 
of  an  irrational  but  dangerous  quality.  Trades  union  and  others 
representing  the  interests  of  workers  in  the  industries  concerned 
assert  pressure  on  governments.  In  parliamentary  democracies, 
such  feelings  cannot  be  ignored  or  discounted  out  of  hand. 
Political  leaders  come  under  intolerable  pressure  to  take 
radical  action  ~gainst  what  is  perceived  - or  misperceived 
as  a  Japanese  threat.  In  the  last  resort,retaliatory  action 
is  taken  against  Japanese  exports,  in  which  the  Community  is 
not  alone.  Japan  retaliates  in  her  turn.  This  escalation 
of  trade  friction  then  produces  a  backlash  in  which  Japanese 
Leaders  who  want  to  see  their  country  more  fully  integrated 
into  the  mainstream  of  the  multilateral  economic  system  are 
prevented  from  pursuing  their  courageous  ~nd  constructive 
policies.  Japan  turns  in  on  herself  once  again,  in  the  pursuit 
of  traditional  values.  I  do  not  need  to  dwell  on  th~  strategic 
and  wider  political  implications  of  such  a  scen2rio. 
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But  instead  of  insulating  herself  from  the  international  economic 
adjustment  process,  Japan  uses  the  headroom  which  her  healthy 
economic  situation  allows  to  help  Lead  the  rest  of  the  world 
out  of  recession  by  stimulating  domestic  demand,  and  doing 
everything  else  possible  to  bring  about  a  genuine  expansion 
of  manufactured  imports,  while  continuing  to  show  consideration 
for  the  difficulties  of  her  trading  partners  by  exercising 
moderation  in  exports  of  those  products  which  are  particularly 
sensitive  to  them.  At  the  same  time,  Japan  pushes  forward 
the  process  of  progressively  taking  on  international  responsibilities 
commensurate  with  her  economic  weight,  both  financially  and 
in  terms  of  economic  Leadership.  Aid  to  the  third  world  is 
increased  as  are  Japanese  contributions  to  the  IMF  and  the  World 
Bank.  Measures  are  introduced  to  stimulate  imports  from  the 
third  world  and  especially  from  the  LLDCs.  Japanese  financial 
markets  are  Liberalised,  bringing  Japanese  interest. rates  more 
into  Line  with  prevailing  international  rates,  and  allowing 
the  Yen  to  assume  an  importance  in  the  international  financial 
structure  which  corresponds  to  Japan's  importance  in  world 
trade.  Japanese  inward  manufacturing  and  value  adding  investment 
in  the  Community  increases,  creating  new  jobs,  and  contributing 
new  technology  and  managerial  skills  to  the  European  economy. 
This in turn  Leads  to  an  influx  of  foreign  investment  into  Japan, 
particularly  in  areas  where  cooperation  between  Japanese,  European 
and  Americans  firms  can  be  most  fruitful.  In  the  new  spirit 
of  mutual  trust  engendered  by  new  Japanese  Laws  to  protect 
foreign  patents,  joint  ventures  become  the  norm.  A  major  Japanese 
firm  is  taken  over  by  a  European  multinational.  Under  the 
influx  of  European  expertise,  Japan's  service  industry  becomes 
a  net  exporter,  compensating  for  Japan's  first  ever  global 
trade  deficit  for  21  years  •••  which  is  where  we  came  in. 
To  return  to  today's  realities,where  does  the  way  ahead 
really  Lie?  I  believe  we  shall  have  - barring  unforeseen 
accidents- a  "soft  Landing".  Recent  experience  suggests  the 
best  hope  Lies  in  cooperation,  not  conflict;  in  the  diplomacy 
of  recognition  and  encounter,  rather  than  of  needless  misundersta~d­
ing  and  friction;  in  the  informed  and  frank  confrontation 
of  issues,  not  the  confrontation  of  one  partner  with  another. 
This  is  why  both  sides  now  put  so  much  effort  into  developing 
the  promising  dialogue  I  described  earlier  on.  And  why  cooperat~o~ 
(commercial,  industrial,developmental,scientific  and  technological) 
is  now  beginning  to  make  headway. 
An  important  step  ahead  has  been  Japan's  acceptance  of 
the  Community  as  such  as  her  natural  interlocuter  on  the  many 
international  economic  issues  where  Europe  is  united.  The 
Foreign  Minister,  Mr  Abe,  made  Europe  his  first  overseas  visit 
after  taking  office,  and  expressed  the  view,  after  the  inaugural 
EC-Japan  Ministerial  "Round  Table",  that  EC-Japan  relations 
had  entered  a  new  stage.  President  Thorn  echoed  this  sentiment 
during  his  official  talks  in  Tokyo  earlier  this  year.  The 
Deputy  Foreign  Minister and  I  reached  the  same  conclusion  in 
our  "High  Level  Consultations"  in  Brussels  Last  month. 
In  terms  of  the  quality  of  the  dialogue  and  of  personal 
relationships  at  all  Levels  this  is  undoubtedly  so.  The  challenge 
now  is  to  draw  the  Logical  consequences  from  the  complementarity 
and  interdependence  of  the  Community  and  the  Japan~se  economies, 
and  to  achieve  a  fuller  an&  more  Lasting  integratiGn  of  Japan 
into  the  multilateral  system.  It  is  a  challenge  which  neither 
we,  nor  Japan,  can  afford  to  funk.  • 